Unanswered Questions on COIN in Afghanistan

I just got done listening to the President's speech on Afghanistan this morning. Unfortunately, I didn't get what I was looking for out of it.

To me, the big questions on Afghanistan are (1) What are our strategic goals in the Afghanistan conflict and (2) what strategy will we use to achieve those goals, and (3) why is this strategy superior to our other alternatives? What I got out of the speech did more or less answer (1) and (2), but the answer to (2) was lacking and (3) was non-existent.

The President does seem to think that preventing another attack is the primary strategic goal, and I think that's appropriately narrow. In theory, we could go for a "integrating the gap" goal as well, although that's probably too ambitious at this time. But, that leads us to the deficiency in the second answer. A COIN strategy will be pursued--much like in Iraq--perhaps too much like Iraq. But a COIN strategy is very likely above and beyond the level of commitment necessary to achieve the stated strategic goal, and is more in line with a grander objectives of bringing Afghanistan into the community of nations and improving regional stability--objectives which are not on the table.

I would like to hear from the President (or the Pentagon) why alternative approaches wouldn't be better. Why is it vital to our security interests that Afghanistan's current government retain power (or perhaps it would be better to say, gain control of the "nation")? Sure, we don't want the country to become a haven for terrorists again. But it's not like the "nation" of Afghanistan (without our help) will have the military might necessary to keep us out. So where is the "safe haven?" We can have ISR assets there at any time, operators on the ground at any time, bomb a training camp at any time, arrest suspected terrorists at any time, etc. etc. Obviously, from a legal perspective, that wouldn't involve treating Afghanistan as a co-equal Westphalian nation-state--which makes perfect sense, because it is not.

Hence the problem with a COIN strategy. Missing completely from the President's speech was any statement suggesting any consideration of the differences between Afghanistan and Iraq. Iraq has been a relatively stable united nation-state with a well-developed national government and an educated middle-class. Success of COIN in Iraq comes largely from providing security to allow the political process to run its course so that the new government can do its job. Afghanistan is entirely different. It isn't a nation-state at all, but a collection of tribes, none of whom care about the non existent "nation" of Afghanistan. There very little civil society or government institutions to build on. A COIN strategy in Afghanistan isn't just about providing security, it is attempting to fundamentally transform the Afghan society in an incredibly radical way. It is an enormous task that is going to take an incredibly long time to achieve, assuming that it can be achieved at all.

And for the President to insist that we can achieve this, with short-term timetables about creating a domestic security force, like Iraq, and benchmarks for political progress, like Iraq, just seems disingenuous. There is no way an Iraq-style surge is going to work as well in Afghanistan. So what we have here is a strategy that is going to require a massive, open-ended, long term commitment, but we are obviously not committed to the level of effort it's going to take.

This administration needs to take a long look at what we need to accomplish, what we can accomplish, and what we're willing to accomplish, and fit our strategy to those parameters. Funny, but I thought that's what we were supposed to be doing with our review of the Afghanistan strategy.

Unbelievable!

I've been watching FNC's coverage of the Maersk Alabama incident, and they've got LTG Tom McInerney (ret.) on making recommendations on how to deal with this incident.

His suggestion? Use the F-22.

What would it do against pirates? They'd be on patrol, and since they can fly at Mach 2, they could respond quickly. Respond and do what, you ask? Answer: strafing runs. And the good General doesn't even think the F-22 could hit the pirate skiffs, just put fire in their vicinity.

Unbelievable. How many US commanders would risk a $178 million fighter (and that's not counting "sunk costs") on a strafing run against a pirate skiff that may have SA-14s on board? Are we really so desperate to plug the F-22 in the wake of the Gates recommendation that we're making these claims?

The F-16 has the same gatling gun the F-22 has for strafing runs, and can shoot it just as accurately. You can get 10 $18 million F-16s for the price of 1 F-22. Having 10x more aircraft on patrol will improve response time a hell of a lot better than the extra .2 Mach or so of speed. And if we get unlucky and lose an F-16 to a shoulder-fired SAM, it will be a major loss, but not the fraking disaster losing an F-22 would be.

Apparently, the case for the F-22 is so weak that we need to pretend we need it as an anti-piracy weapon.

Strategy Makes A Comeback

Secretary Gates presented his recommendations for the restructuring of our armed forces to the president today. Overall, it's a sound, bold new plan. The best thing about the plan is that it comes from a strategic view, not politics, ambition, or...whatever the hell it is we base our procurement on these days.

The Big Winner in all of this is the small-wars crowd, while the Cold Warriors take quite a thumping. Gates summarized the strategy that the force will be built on as: "we must rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies." Short and sweet, that means small-wars, crisis repsonse, counterinsurgency and the like is the new "meat and potatoes" of our armed forces. The Cold Warriors who wanted to maintain a high-end force that could hand China's ass to it with 0 casualties are not going to get what they want. Which is as it should be, since major wars are rare and becoming rarer, while our military in constantly invovled in crisis response and small wars.

Last week, in his statement to the HASC, Thomas Barnett aptly described this choice:

It is my professional opinion that the United States defense community currently accepts too much risk AND casualties AND instability on the low end of the combat spectrum while continuing to spend far too much money on building up our combat capabilities for high-end scenarios. In effect, we over-feed our Leviathan force while starving our SysAdmin force, accepting far too many avoidable casualties in the latter while hedging excessively against theoretical future casualties in the former. Personally, I find this risk-management strategy to be both strategically unsound and morally reprehensible.

Gates shares the same sentiment:

But, it is important to remember that every defense dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk – or, in effect, to "run up the score" in a capability where the United States is already dominant – is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take.

Here are the highlights of the recommendations:
*Army and USMC come out ahead in personnel.
*Moar Choppars for the army, lots more ISR, including UAVs and some turboprops that I'll need to look into. I'm guessing relatively cheap aircraft with modern IR sensors.
*Improved air/sea lift capabilities
*Reaffirmed committment to LCS
*F-35 comes out as a winner
*F-22 to end at 187.
*Land and Sea Based theatre missile defenses reaffirmed (winners: SM-3, THAAD. Losers: Alaska, ABL, Multiple Kill Vehicle)
*Reaffirmed KC-X
*Replacement for Ohio SSBNs
*NO NEW (nuclear?) BOMBERS
*10-carrier Navy
*CG-X delayed
*DDG-1000 ended at 3, DDG-51 class restarted
*Reduced procurement of the surface fleet
*Amphib programs delayed (this surpises me)
*VH-71 Cancelled
*CSAR-X Cancelled
*FCS to be replaced with a new program

ACQUISITION REFORM
*Wants mature technology requirements, realism in anticipating threats, end requirements-creep
*more acquisition staff, greater oversight, stricter contact terms

For the most part, this looks like a very sensible plan. My only major concern is that we over-emphasize air supremacy over what we do when we have that supremacy. Between the F-22 and F-35, it makes some sense that the F-35 comes out the winner, but what we really need are dedicated CAS aircraft (although, to be fair, the plan does call for an increase in Army helicopters) and high-endurance bombers. The report does say no new bombers, but I'm not clear if they mean no bombers at all or no new bombers as part of our nuclear forces. I don't think we need nuclear bombers; SSBNs and ordinary strike aircraft can take care of that. What I don't want, however, are high-end aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 loitering over countries like Afghanistan or Iraq waiting for a call to go drop a JDAM on some insurgents, burning millions of dollars of jet fuel while they wait. I want a cheap aircraft like a dedicated CAS plane or a high-endurance plane like a bomber (more loiter time=less sorties=less operating costs and less wasted fuel) or even a high-endurance armed UAV to do that. The good news on this front: increased ISR, including UAVs and high-endurance turboprops. The bottom line is that once you have air supremacy, you don't need to be flying every mission with superfighters that can handle MiGs, SAMs, jamming at the same time while supporting the troops on the ground. You can fly the support missions with cheap planes designed for the specific missions they're going to be performing. Something like an A-10 or AC-130, even a B-52. Just have a few superfighters flying CAP on the borders to keep the airspace safe for the support aircraft and you're golden.

I'm also having some difficulty reconciling how Gates says his missile defense focus "on the rogue state AND theater missile threats" while funding only the theatre-defense programs but not those designed to protect against long range missiles from, e.g., Iran or the DPRK. I would be OK with focusing the technology on the theatre threat, while leaving the long range threat from the rogues to deterrence/preemption/anti-proliferation, but that's not what Gates said.

Those gripes aside, this is a very welcome change.

China Stepping Up

Major General Jin Yinan has announced China's intention to get involved in anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. This has the potential to be huge---for once, instead of being the UNSC member obstructing solutions to international problems, they're going to play an active part. This comes on the heels of a unanimous UNSC reslolution that renewed authorization to persue pirates into Somali waters, authorized the detention and disposition of suspected pirate vessels, and perhaps most significantly, called on member states to establish laws to enable them to prosecute those arrested.

I've been looking forward to the opportunity for the US to start working with China as a partner rather than as a rival. And for that to happen, China has to start realizing that its interests coincide with ours---in open, secure markets, regional stability, and increased connectedness. Their intention to get involved in the piracy issue means that they're starting to think about more responsibilities as a major power and less about the Taiwan issue or a potential rivalry with us. (EDIT: Galrahn beat me to it: "that might be the smell of maturity.") As this plays out, we can look forward to an increasing partnership with China, which means the looming war between us becomes less likely, and hopefully at some point we'll be able to reallocate part of that part of the defense budget to something more useful. Good times.

Thinking Strategically (Or, How Galrahn Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pirates)

Gal's given me another reason to plug Information Dissemination with two of his latest insightful posts. So seldom do we find anyone who thinks about the big picture.

I'm not going to bother quoting key passages, as these are definitely worth taking in in their entirety:

Observing the Strategic Success of US Policy Toward Somali Piracy

Are Pirates the Problem, Or the Solution?

(Related OI post: Piracy a blessing in disguise?)