The Russian Crossroads

For those of us that missed it (and yes, that included me; I had to watch it a day late on grainy State Dept. video), Secretary Rice gave a major speech on Russia yesterday, which might be considered something of an epilogue on the war in Georgia. It's worth reading/watching in its entirety, but here is a summary and some highlights:


Rice lamented an emerging pattern of behavior by the Russians:

I’m referring, among other things, to Russia’s intimidation of its sovereign neighbors, its use of oil and gas as a political weapon, its unilateral suspension of the CFE Treaty, its threat to target peaceful nations with nuclear weapons, its arms sales to states and groups that threaten international security, and its persecution – and worse – of Russian journalists, and dissidents, and others.

The picture emerging from this pattern of behavior is that of a Russia increasingly authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad.

Rice admitted that Georgia had been foolish in responding to S. Ossetian shelling with an offensive operation; however, this did not amount to fault:

But Russia’s leaders used this as a pretext to launch what, by all appearances, was a premeditated invasion of its independent neighbor. Indeed, Russia’s leaders had laid the groundwork for this scenario months ago – distributing Russian passports to Georgian separatists, training and arming their militias, and then justifying the campaign across Georgia’s border as an act of self-defense.

Regarding the aftermath of the war, Rice said an EU force of peacekeepers was ready to deploy to the separatist regions, but Russia has refused to allow international monitors and NGO's into the regions, "despite ongoing militia violence and retribution against innocent Georgians." (Do recall that a lack of a neutral peacekeeping force in the regions was one of the principal causes of the war.) Predictably, there was no tough talk about restoring Georgia's borders; only a softly-spoken line about hoping that the provinces will be turned back peacefully at some point in the future.

Rice also commented about Russia's lame "how would you like it if our military assets were in the Carri bean" attempt to punish us for having warships (well, really, just one "warship"--a DDG--and a command ship and a coast guard cutter) in the Black Sea. She said Russia was free to associate with countries in the Western hemisphere...

But we are confident that our ties with our neighbors – who long for better education and better health care and better jobs, and better housing – will in no way be diminished by a few, aging Blackjack bombers, visiting one of Latin America’s few autocracies, which is itself being left behind by an increasingly peaceful and prosperous and democratic hemisphere.

Rice also hit the familiar points about Russia isolating itself from world economic institutions, and how this war only hurt them without accomplishing any "enduring strategic objective." The language of liberalism appeared frequently, especially with regard to globalisation and democracy.

Moving onto the more strategically consequential parts, Rice noted an apparent shift in the world-view of the Russians from the liberal, globalised outlook to a rather backward looking view; which she impliedly attributed to Putin.

But perhaps the worst fallout for Moscow is that its behavior has fundamentally called into question whose vision of Russia is really guiding that country. There was a time recently when the new president of Russia laid out a positive and forward-looking vision of his nation’s future.

This was a vision that took into account Russia’s vulnerabilities: its declining population and heartbreaking health problems; its failure thus far to achieve a high-tech, diversified economy like those to Russia’s west and increasingly to Russia’s east; and the disparity between people’s quality of life in Moscow, and St. Petersburg, and in a few other cities – and those in Russia’s countryside.
This was a vision that called for strengthening the rule of law, and rooting out corruption, and investing in Russia’s people, and creating opportunities not just for an elite few, but for all Russian citizens to share in prosperity.

This was a vision that rested on what President Medvedev referred to as the “Four I’s”: investment, innovation, institutional reform, and infrastructure improvements to expand Russia’s economy. And this was a vision that recognized that Russia cannot afford a relationship with the world that is based on antagonism and alienation.

This is especially true in today’s world, which increasingly is not organized around polarity – multi-, uni-, and certainly not bi-. In this world, there is an imperative for nations to build a network of strong and unique ties to many influential states.

And that is a far different context than much of the last century, when U.S. foreign policy was, frankly, hostage to our relationship with the Soviet Union. We viewed everything through that lens, including our relations with other countries. We were locked in a zero-sum, ideological conflict. Every state was to choose sides, and that reduced our options.

Well, thankfully, that world is also gone forever, and it’s not coming back. As a result, the United States is liberated to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy. And that is what we are doing.

This view, one might assume, is what leads to the differences in how Russia and the West view the role of the NATO alliance. Rice described our view of NATO as:

With the end of the Cold War, we and our allies have worked to transform NATO – form – to bring it from an alliance that manned the ramparts of a divided Europe, to a means for nurturing the growth of a Europe whole, free, and at peace – and an alliance that confronts the dangers, like terrorism, that also threaten Russia.

We have opened NATO to any sovereign, democratic state in Europe that can meet its standards of membership. We’ve supported the right of countries emerging from communism to choose what path of development they pursue and what institutions they wish to join.

But, the Russians:

[V]ew the emergence of free and independent democratic neighbors – most recently, during the so-called “color revolutions” in Georgia, and Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan – not as a source of security, but as a source of threat to Russia’s interests.

Where do we go from here?

[O]ur strategic goal now is to make clear to Russia’s leaders that their choices could put Russia on a one-way path to self-imposed isolation and international irrelevance....We cannot afford to validate the prejudices that some Russian leaders seem to have: that if you press free nations hard enough – if you bully them, and you threaten them, and you lash out – they will cave in, and they’ll forget, and eventually they will concede.

The United States and Europe must stand up to this kind of behavior, and to all who champion it. For our sake – and for the sake of Russia’s people, who deserve a better relationship with the rest of the world – the United States and Europe must not allow Russia’s aggression to achieve any benefit. Not in Georgia – not anywhere.
***
We will resist any Russian attempt to consign sovereign nations and free peoples to some archaic “sphere of influence.”
***
And we will not allow Russia to wield a veto over the future of the Euro-Atlantic community – neither what states are offered membership, nor the choice of states that accept it. We have made this particularly clear to our friends in Ukraine.

Analysis

Overall, I think this is very consistent with our strategic thinking. We are trying to pressure Russia to deepen its ties to the world economic market, become more democratic, thus attempting to capitalize of the peace dividends from economic interdependence and the "democratic peace." Russia's partial integration, as they are now, threatens this system and creates the potential for conflict.

Moving onto the details, I find encouragement in that she showed some empathy for the Russians, both in terms of their paranoia (quoted) and their desire to regain their previous strength (not quoted). It's also encouraging that this empathy is not simply words; Rice has highlighted our invitations to offer the Russians transparency on our ABM systems and the seat Russia has at every NATO summit. There is no doubt we are trying to assuage their fears--the problem is that they still don't believe us.

And therein lies the problem. We don't want NATO to be about opposing Russia anymore. That world, to us, is over. But clearly, it's not to the Russians. They see NATO as the same enemy they did during the Cold War; and when NATO expands to their border they lose their post-WWII "buffer." When they attack Georgia, threaten Poland, foment riots in and cyber-attack Estonia, and speculate about an invasion of Crimea, they are forcing NATO to live in their world. The prophecy becomes self-fulfilling. So, while we insist NATO is about terrorism and more generalized collective security (which is true as an ideal), the reality is that NATO is very much concerned about preventing another Georgia. Which in turn confirms Russia's (Putin's) worldview and puts the (Medvedev's) integration/reform agenda on hold.

...and that puts us on a track to a new cold war. I don't see anything here that gets us off that track. Sure, there is clearly a lot of economic pressure on Russia, but can we expect them to place their comfort over (what they believe is) their security?

Deciphering the Russian Strategy

I think the strategic goal of the Russian invasion of Georgia is to undermine the effectiveness of the NATO alliance. I'll admit this is very thin at this opening juncture, but, the theory fits the facts on the ground and seems to make sense.

Let's start with the Russian's operational goals in Georgia. We know that despite two ceasefire agreements, the Russians continue to destroy military facilities and civilian infrastructure, and they have declared their intention to continue these "security operations" until Monday. The scope of these operations is clearly much, much greater than is necessary for the security of the people of S. Ossetia, in whose name the invasion was purportedly launched. They are trying to destroy as much of Georgia's military capability as they can, cripple their economy, and generally destroy as much as possible.

We also know that the Russians have moved irregular "volunteer" forces into Georgia, and that rebel militias in Abkhazia and S. Ossetia have been causing trouble both inside and outside of their respective provinces. This suggests that there will continue to be violence in Georgia long after the Russian army has left. The destruction of Georgia's military will give these irregulars a wide berth to cause trouble. Georgia is about to become another Iraq--a weak, discredited government will be fighting an insurgency in its borders. They're going to need help.

We've already committed to a humanitarian and reconstruction mission. We've said we don't expect this to be an operation involving military force, but this is naive. There have already least two instances of these irregulars interfering with humanitarian aid convoys. Unless we want another Mogadishu on our hands, we will need to support our humanitarian effort with military force. We can also fully expect attacks by irregulars against civilian infrastructure that Georgia is attempting to rebuild. Oh, and another thing---Russia has absolutely no intention of honoring its word to turn the rebel provinces over to international peacekeepers. They continued to sent in fresh reinforcements to both provinces after the first ceasefire agreement; not to mention they have pretty much announced their intentions in the media. We can expect these provinces to act as a safe haven for rebel forces to operate out of and retreat to--an area where the victorious "sweep and hold" counterinsurgency strategy cannot be implemented.

Russia has essentially handed the US a lose-lose situation. We are already stretched too thin to get involved in another insurgency. So we can either underestimate the commitment involved in Georgia and wear our military down to the point that we can't back up our obligations to NATO; or, we do nothing and allow Georgia to collapse, in which case NATO and Eastern Europe won't be looking to us for help either. If Western Europe decided to pull their weight in Georgia, this situation could be avoided, but the Russians are gambling on them being too timid to do so. It's a pretty safe bet given their track record.

Did I Mention I Love These Guys?

Another Gem from Information Dissemnation:

With the Navy being given the green light, we are about to observe the first major US Navy operation since the 2005 Tsunami. That may not sound like much to those not familiar with that story, but it is. These events will further shape the way we look at military power strategically.

For the second time in the 21st century, the United States is about to exercise military power in a major way other than war, but instead of confronting the challenge of a natural disaster, this time the confrontation is with a military power exercising political control. Is this a military mission? In the 21st century, yes.

But not in your traditional way. This is the perfect example why military strategy is incomplete when it focuses only on the duties of conducting war. This is not a peacekeeping mission, peacekeeping is what nations do when the UN asks them to fill space between wars. This scenario, the full spectrum multi-agency option other than war, logistically supported by the tools of war, is what we mean when we use the world peacemaking in 21st century strategy.

This is the black dot in the white side of the Yin Yang. This will be interesting.

http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2008/08/all-ahead-slow.html

Black Sea Missile Battle?

Found a great naval blog, http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/. They're passing on a story from the Ukrainian press about the details of the naval battle reported some days ago, when a Georgian missile boat was reported sunk. Here's the account:

We took up station guarding the opposed landing on the Abkhaz shore when all of a sudden four high speed targets were detected. We sent out an IFF signal and the targets didn't react. Receiving a command from the flagship, we got into formation and right at that moment the unidentified targets opened fire on the ship formation and flagship. The cruiser was damaged and a small fire broke out aboard. Then, fearing for seaworthyness, the flagship withdrew from the firing area." - the sailor said.

"Right then the small missile boats clearly fired," the participant continued. "Taking up position, our MRK launched a "Malakhit" (SS-N-9) anti-surface missile, which literally cut the lead ship, the "Tbilisi" to ribbons. After that, fire was shifted to the rest of the Georgian ships. Another ship was damaged, we couldn't finish it off, allowing it to leave the scene under its own power.

Three interesting items of note there. First of all, that could not have been the Tblisi, and I can prove it. Here she is, burning at port:




And here she is on her better days:


Georgia has no other boats of that class, so it's definitely her. So, the unfortunate implication is that the boat this sailor believes he sunk was actually Georgia's only other (and much more powerful) missile boat, the Dioskuria. Damn. (Or, there were no Georgian missile boats there at all.)

Item two: Apparently the mighty Moskva was hit in this fight and had to withdraw. Did the infamous Exocet strike again? Or were the Russian ships just incapable of keeping the Georgian gunboats at a safe distance and got shelled? In any case, the Slava-class design "is said to be marred by large quantities of flammable material and poor damage-control capabilities," so a small amount of damage might take it out of the fight. I'd hate to be on board if those Sandboxes started cooking off...



Thirdly, as far as I'm aware, this is the first time the SS-N-9 Siren was used in combat. If only one was fired, then it's 1/1.... but I suspect they fired several and mostly missed. They might have been too close for it to be as effective as it could have been.

EDIT:
I just wanted to follow up on this post since I recently installed SiteMeter and noticed this article is still getting hits. The best evidence now suggests the ship sunk in the skirmish was a gunboat; not either of the missile boats Tblisi or Dioskiria. The Dio was towed out to sea from Poti and scuttled.

More here.

How do you say "dumbass" in French or German?

You would think that after WWII, everyone would have learned that appeasement is bad foreign policy. Well, I guess being on the wrong side of that war prevented Germany from learning that lesson. I have no idea what France's excuse is.

Why do I say this? Well, France and Germany opposed Georgia's entry into NATO because they were fearful of angering Russia. If Georgia had been a NATO member, Russia would have been deterred from invading Georgia. There would not be a shooting war going on now, 2000+ people would still be alive, and the US and EU wouldn't have to put the pieces back together when it's all over.

The lesson here is obvious, and it's a lesson we all should have learned long ago. When you're dealing with a bully, show strength, not weakness. Bullies love to act when they know they can get away with it.