Linked: British Purge Commanders Over Iran-Hostage Drama

THE British navy has completed a discreet clean-out of the senior figures involved in the debacle over the arrest by Iranian Revolutionary Guards of 15 British sailors and marines.

Those involved in the Royal Navy's humiliation at the hands of Tehran have been pushed out of their high-profile jobs as part of an attempt to sweep away any reminder of the debacle...

The victims include two vice-admirals, the captain of the ship on which the boat crews served and a senior official in the failed public relations operation that followed their return to Britain.

Full article

Benchmarks of Success

With the testimony of General Patraeus and Ambassador Crocker taking place this week, I've become a bit of a news junkie once again. And inevitably, after forcing myself to listen to the talking heads, I get a little miffed with the crap that they spew forth.

There's plenty of talking points with reference to Iraq that I'd like to counter-spew on, but there is one that outweighs all others, and that is this nonsensical focus on these so-called "benchmarks."

Let me be absolutely clear on this point. There is only ONE benchmark that matters in Iraq. One, and that's it. And that benchmark is the legitimacy of the democratically elected government. That legitimacy is what Al-Qaida and opportunistic warlords are trying to undermine; to cause it to crumble and be replaced by something more to their liking. Success in counterinsurgency means preventing that from happening. All other goals in counterinsurgency are subordinate to this goal.

Yet, when the pundits spout off about the "benchmarks," there is no context--no reference how these supposed failures indicate that our strategy is failing. In fact, even the majority of the media covering the story don't even bother to tell you exactly what the benchmarks are. Well, here they are, on page 3 of this pdf.

The Iraqi government's failure to achieve many of these benchmarks is significant, to a point. But taken in context, they don't mean we're losing. This list is all about legislative progress... legislative progress expected of a parliamentary system in a time when the population doesn't even know for sure what sort of state they want Iraq to be! We Americans couldn't even get our first Constitution to work at all before we had to throw in the towel and start again, and to this day our Congress doesn't get much done. And that's without a war going on during the drafting and in a 2-party system! Yet somehow we expect the legislature in Iraq to crank out crucial law after law with all the efficiency of an assembly line? Get real... That isn't a sign that we're losing---it's NORMAL, especially under the circumstances.

To be sure, effectiveness of a government is important to establishing and maintaining its legitimacy; and this is especially true in cultures used to more authoritarian forms of government. The benchmarks do matter--but the way that matter is that they are a sign that could indicate that the people might become frustrated with the government and turn away from it. And turning away could simply mean electing different representatives, or amending the constitution to fix the problem. It isn't necessarily indicative of the rejection of democratic rule in favor of theocracy, or even the rejection of national rule in favor of breaking the state along sectarian lines. To evaluate our strategy, you need to look at other signs that factor into the one benchmark that matters--legitimacy.

Those factors are mentioned all over Ambassador Crocker's testimony, but apparently no one was listening. The gains in the security situation are reviving Iraqi markets and their economy. Local businesses are being simulated and employment is rising. Foreign direct investment is on the rise. 74 states have pledged economic assistance to Iraq. Oil revenues are being shared, even without the benchmarked legislation going through. Informal reconciliation is taking place with the reintegration of former insurgents into the Iraqi security forces--also without the benchmarked legislation on amnesty being passed yet. Most strikingly, the people of Anbar overwhelmingly rejected Al-Qaeda and volunteered to work with the coalition to remove them, and AQ is being broadly rejected overall. Al-Sadr has reigned in the Mahdi army in response to the backlash against the targeting of worshippers and Iranian meddling.

Not all signs are positive. Particularly troubling to me is the electricity situation (also mentioned in Crocker's testimony), the stagnation in the training of Iraqi forces (from General Patraeus's tables), and the polls indicating (1)that the Iraqi public considered life to have gotten worse during that surge; and (2) that the people were divided about 53-47% as to whether US forces should stay or leave (respectively). Those indicators say at least as much about legitimacy as the failure of the central government to enact certain legislation.

In the greater scheme of counterinsurgency, political gains should follow institutional and economic gains, and institutional and economic gains should follow military gains. The military gains are definitely happening; you'd have to really stick your head in the sand not to see that at this point. Economic and institutional indicators appear largely positive. Political gains are occurring mostly at the local level, while progress is lacking at the national level. With the new strategy in place less than a year, and the surge in full swing only a few months, it's very encouraging to see many second-order and some third-order effects already. The data at this point overwhelmingly indicates that the strategy is working.

Which shouldn't be too surprising. General Patraeus, after all, literally did write the book on counterinsurgency. Success is mostly a matter of taking back the initiative we gave away to the insurgency by having our heads up our asses when the occupation began. It would appear from the military situation that the initiative is ours, and the rest will flow from that.

Forging a Wold of Liberty Under Law?

I'm just going to post these excerpts from the Interim Iraqi Constitution (March 2004) without comment. They pretty much speak for themselves.

Article 13.
(A) Public and private freedoms shall be protected.
(B) The right of free expression shall be protected.
(C) The right of free peaceable assembly and the right to join associations freely, as well as the right to form and join unions and political parties freely, in accordance with the law, shall be guaranteed.
(D) Each Iraqi has the right of free movement in all parts of Iraq and the right to travel abroad and return freely.
(E) Each Iraqi has the right to demonstrate and strike peaceably in accordance with the law.
(F) Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited.
(G) Slavery, the slave trade, forced labor, and involuntary servitude with or without pay, shall be forbidden.
(H) Each Iraqi has the right to privacy.

Article 15
(B) Police, investigators, or other governmental authorities may not violate the sanctity of private residences, whether these authorities belong to the federal or regional governments, governorates, municipalities, or local administrations, unless a judge or investigating magistrate has issued a search warrant in accordance with applicable law on the basis of information provided by a sworn individual who knew that bearing false witness would render him liable to punishment. Extreme exigent circumstances, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may justify a warrantless search, but such exigencies shall be narrowly construed. In the event that a warrantless search is carried out in the absence of an extreme exigent circumstance, the evidence so seized, and any other evidence found derivatively from such search, shall be inadmissible in connection with a criminal charge, unless the court determines that the person who carried out the warrantless search believed reasonably and in good faith that the search was in accordance with the law.
C) No one may be unlawfully arrested or detained, and no one may be detained by reason of political or religious beliefs.
(D) All persons shall be guaranteed the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, regardless of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Notice of the proceeding and its legal basis must be provided to the accused without delay.
(E) The accused is innocent until proven guilty pursuant to law, and he likewise has the right to engage independent and competent counsel, to remain silent in response to questions addressed to him with no compulsion to testify for any reason, to participate in preparing his defense, and to summon and examine witnesses or to ask the judge to do so. At the time a person is arrested, he must be notified of these rights.
(F) The right to a fair, speedy, and open trial shall be guaranteed.
(G) Every person deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall have the right of recourse to a court to determine the legality of his arrest or detention without delay and to order his release if this occurred in an illegal manner.
(I) Civilians may not be tried before a military tribunal. Special or exceptional courts may not be established.
(J) Torture in all its forms, physical or mental, shall be prohibited under all circumstances, as shall be cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. No confession made under compulsion, torture, or threat thereof shall be relied upon or admitted into evidence for any reason in any proceeding, whether criminal or otherwise.

(emphasis added)